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Organization and Safety 
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Abstract 
Although the causes of the Deepwater Horizon spill are not yet conclusively identified, 
significant attention has focused on the safety-related policies and practices—often referred to as the 
safety culture—of BP and other firms involved in drilling the well. This paper defines and characterizes 
the economic and policy forces that affect safety culture and identifies reasons why those forces may or 
may not be adequate or effective from the public’s perspective. Two potential justifications for policy 
intervention are that: a) not all of the social costs of a spill may be internalized by a firm; and b) there 
may be principal-agency problems within the firm, which could be reduced by external monitoring. The 
paper discusses five policies that could increase safety culture and monitoring: liability, financial 
responsibility (a requirement that a firm’s assets exceed a threshold), government oversight, mandatory 
private insurance, and risk-based drilling fees. We find that although each policy has a positive effect on 
safety culture, there are important differences and interactions that must be considered. In particular, the 
latter three provide external monitoring. Furthermore, raising liability caps without mandating insurance 
or raising financial responsibility requirements could have a small effect on the safety culture of small 
firms that would declare bankruptcy in the event of a large spill. The paper concludes with policy 
recommendations for promoting stronger safety culture in offshore drilling; our preferred approach would 
be to set a liability cap for each well equal to the worst-case social costs of a spill, and to require 
insurance up to the cap.  
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Deepwater Drilling: Law, Policy, and Economics of Firm 
Organization and Safety 
Mark A. Cohen, Madeline Gottlieb, Joshua Linn, and Nathan Richardson 
All findings, opinions, statements, and recommendations contained in this report are solely those of its 
authors. The report has been submitted to the staff of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill and Offshore Drilling, but the report is not the work product of the Commission or its staff, and should not be 
construed in any respect as the official or unofficial findings, opinions, statements, or recommendations of the 
Commission or its staff. 
Executive Summary 
After the Deepwater Horizon explosion on April 20, 2010 and the subsequent oil spill, 
policymakers, researchers, industry experts and the public began to question the safety of 
deepwater drilling. Several preliminary reports have concluded that, before the accident, it was 
widely believed among industry and regulators that the possibility of a spill of this magnitude 
was minimal. Consequently, industry, federal and state governments were unprepared to respond 
effectively to such a large spill. These events have spurred calls for legislation that promotes 
safety in the offshore oil drilling industry.        
This paper examines the role of safety culture in preventing accidents on deep water 
offshore oil rigs, where safety culture is defined as the set of values held by employees and the 
firm’s policies that lead employees to prioritize health, safety, and the environment. We evaluate 
the economic grounds for government intervention in promoting a stronger safety culture at 
firms involved in deepwater drilling. Potentially, there are two reasons why firms may not 
choose the socially optimal level of safety culture: (1) firms do not fully internalize the social 
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costs of a spill; and (2) principal-agency problems within the firm may cause incentives for 
adopting safety culture to be different for employees and owners of the firm. Using this 
framework, we conclude that current economic and policy incentives are insufficient for 
promoting safety culture, which provides two rationales for government policy intervention. 
Policies should force internalization of spill costs and promote third-party monitoring to reduce 
principal-agency problems within the firm. 
In this context we examine several potential policy changes, including raising liability 
caps, increasing financial responsibility requirements (that is, the assets a firm must have), 
requiring third-party insurance, increasing government oversight, and imposing risk-based fees. 
Each policy individually has a positive effect on safety culture, but policy makers and the public 
should be aware of the interactions among policies. Liability caps, for example, are particularly 
effective when complemented by financial responsibility requirements or third-party insurance; 
raising liability caps without raising financial responsibility requirements or requiring insurance 
would have little effect on safety culture at small firms that would declare bankruptcy because of 
an inability to pay damages.   
Summary of Findings: 
  Current liability caps are below the worst case damages from drilling, although liability 
caps are often not binding because of access to other remedies, such as state law actions. 
Liability caps do, however, reduce expected damages in some cases (such as when state 
law includes caps), and create legal barriers for plaintiffs that likely affect settlement 
terms.  
  Raising liability caps increases the benefit of adopting a strong safety culture provided 
that the expected damages plus other costs are not greater than the firm’s assets. High 
exposure to liability forces firms to internalize costs, thus promoting a stronger safety 
culture. 
  Current financial responsibility requirements are well below expected worst-case 
damages. For small firms, raising liability caps would have a small effect on safety 
culture because they would declare bankruptcy in the event of a large spill (in the absence 
of insurance). 
  Significantly increasing liability caps and financial responsibility may push some 
nonmajor oil exploration companies out of the Gulf if they would be unable to afford 
liability insurance. These effects are likely outweighed by small firms’ failure to fully 
internalize social costs. Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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  Following the Deepwater Horizon spill, the federal government has required drilling 
firms to adopt safety and environmental management systems. Without adequate 
monitoring or enforcement, firms could satisfy these requirements on paper without 
significantly strengthening their safety culture. 
  Risk-based fees, either as part of an insurance pool or permitting fees, would encourage a 
strong safety culture and could provide third-party monitoring. 
  Increasing the liability cap and mandating equivalent insurance has a similarly positive 
effect on safety culture as raising the liability caps and financial responsibility 
requirements. 
Irrespective of other policy changes, the Deepwater Horizon spill demonstrates a need for 
stronger government oversight. Our recommendation is a set of policies that, together, would 
improve safety culture for offshore drilling:  
  Raise the liability cap to the level of social damages expected from the estimated worst-
case spill for each well.  
  Require third-party insurance to cover cleanup and containment costs, and economic and 
natural resources damages associated with a spill. 
  If insurance is not feasible, firms should be required to display proof of financial 
responsibility equal to the maximum liability of the well, if not higher.    
  Risk-based drilling fees should be used as part of an insurance pool, the MWCC, or in 
other contexts such as leasing and permitting.  
1. Introduction 
Although the causes of the Deepwater Horizon spill are not yet conclusively identified, 
significant attention has focused on the safety-related policies and practices—often referred to as 
the safety culture—of BP and other firms involved in drilling the well. The magnitude of the 
spill has stirred public interest in ensuring that the safety culture of these firms, and indeed of the 
offshore drilling industry generally, are appropriate for their high-risk activities. This paper 
defines and characterizes the economic and policy forces that affect safety culture and identifies 
reasons why those forces may or may not be adequate or effective from the public’s perspective. 
We conclude by offering policy recommendations designed to improve safety culture in the 
industry. Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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Following the Deepwater Horizon spill, organizations, analysts, and policymakers have 
advanced a wide range of proposals that aim to reduce the likelihood of a future catastrophe. 
Many proposals would mandate the use of specific technologies and engineering practices, such 
as requiring more extensive testing of blowout preventers and designing wells to have a 
minimum number of barriers (Joint Industry Task Force 2010). Other proposals address the 
system level, such as requiring a safety case that would demonstrate to the regulator that the 
entire system meets a particular level of safety (U.S. Department of Interior 2010). Even more 
broadly, some analysts and observers have suggested that a stronger safety culture—particularly 
on the part of BP but also other firms—might have prevented the spill and would reduce the 
likelihood of future spills. For example, it was said to be acceptable at BP to increase the risk of 
a spill in order to reduce costs. Rep. Joe Barton stated, “Our hearings discovered that significant 
cost-cutting measures resulted in decreased maintenance and inspections of the pipeline, and 
BP’s management culture deterred individuals from raising safety concerns” (U.S. House of 
Representatives 2010). The University of California–Berkeley’s Deep Water Horizon Study 
Group concluded, “Cost cutting, failure to invest, and production pressures characterized BP 
executive manager behaviors” (DHSG 2010b, 4). Some proposals call for changes in government 
policy that could affect the organization and safety culture at a firm, such as increases in the 
liability cap; others simply suggest that firms ought to adopt a stronger safety culture.  
Will the Deepwater Horizon spill cause the industry to adopt a stronger safety culture on 
its own, in the absence of policy changes? Some evidence suggests this may be occurring 
already. In September 2010, for example, BP announced significant changes in its internal 
structure and the way in which safety will be handled company-wide (BP 2010). But the reasons 
behind such safety-related changes are impossible to determine. Perhaps BP was responding to 
new information about risks. Or the changes might be a reaction to public pressure—in other 
words, new terms in the social contract under which they operate. Or they could anticipate future 
policy changes, such as stricter regulation (or even be an attempt to preempt such changes), in 
which case they may actually prove the need for stronger government policy. 
Two broad questions have received little attention since Deepwater Horizon: first, is 
there economic justification for government policy aimed at improving safety culture; and 
second, if justified, what policies would encourage—or hinder—a stronger safety culture at 
firms? This paper provides a framework for evaluating potential justifications for government 
intervention, and it assesses policy options for improving safety culture. 
The next section discusses the safety culture literature and provides a theoretical 
framework for assessing different safety culture policies. Studies of past major accidents in Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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different industries have given rise to a substantial management literature. Researchers have 
examined a range of “high reliability” industries and tried to identify the characteristics most 
commonly associated with firms that have a strong safety culture. One definition of safety 
culture in this literature is the set of values held by employees and the firm’s policies that lead 
employees to prioritize health, safety, and the environment (von Thaden and Gibbons 2008).1 
Many policies, initiatives, and procedures affect a deepwater drilling firm’s safety culture, and 
thereby affect employees’ actions that could cause a spill. Examples include providing worker 
training and using a compensation structure that encourages individuals to make decisions that 
increase safety. The central premise of our framework is that upper management chooses internal 
policies that affect safety culture and makes decisions that embody it. Lower-level managers and 
other employees respond to incentives created by upper management, thereby creating a link 
between safety culture and safety outcomes. In this context, there are two general reasons that 
the firm may not choose the socially optimal level of safety culture: a) not all of the social costs 
of a spill may be internalized; and b) there may be principal-agency problems within the firm. 
Both factors create a potential justification for government policy aimed at promoting a strong 
safety culture. 
The framework in Section 2 applies to any industry; Section 3 discusses economic factors 
that affect safety culture in deepwater drilling, with particular focus on whether these factors 
encourage the socially optimal level of safety culture. Although markets do create positive 
incentives for safety culture, there are important informational problems that may prevent firms 
from choosing the socially optimal safety culture. These problems create a justification for 
policies that provide some monitoring (that is, policies that reveal to the public the degree of 
safety culture), in addition to policies that promote a stronger safety culture. 
Section 4 discusses five policies that could increase safety culture and monitoring: 
liability, financial responsibility (a requirement that a firm’s assets exceed a threshold), 
government oversight, mandatory private insurance, and risk-based drilling fees. We find that 
                                                 
1 Numerous definitions, often closely related, are available in the literature. For example, James Reason has defined 
safety culture as “the product of individual and group values, attitudes, competencies, and patterns of behavior that 
determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety programmes” 
(Weick and Sutcliffe 2001). Some authors use “a culture of safety” to mean that the culture is centered on safety as 
the main priority. Others use “safety culture” to denote that every organization has a culture of safety that sits on a 
spectrum from poor to strong. Some authors use “high-reliability organization” (HRO) to refer to organizations with 
exceptionally strong safety cultures that effectively minimize accidents. For purposes of this paper, we use “strong 
safety culture” to indicate the qualities of an HRO.  Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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although each policy has a positive effect on safety culture, there are important differences—in 
particular, the latter three provide external monitoring that could reduce principal-agency 
problems. Furthermore, interactions among these policies mean that they should be jointly 
determined. Importantly, raising or eliminating the liability cap without raising the financial 
responsibility requirement would be insufficient for promoting safety culture at small firms 
because they might declare bankruptcy in the event of a large spill and avoid paying the costs. 
Section 5 concludes with our policy recommendations for promoting stronger safety 
culture in offshore drilling. The two policy objectives are for firms to internalize the social costs 
of a spill when they choose safety culture, and to increase third-party monitoring. Our preferred 
approach would be to set a liability cap for each well equal to the worst-case social costs of a 
spill, and to require insurance up to the cap. We note that even in this liability regime, the public 
may not be able to recover all social costs, and additional policies, such as stronger government 
oversight, would be justified. If mandatory private insurance is not feasible, raising the cap and 
the financial responsibility requirement would also have a significant effect on safety culture, 
particularly if this approach is combined with stronger government oversight. In either case, 
imposing risk-based drilling fees (for example, via license fees or insurance premiums) would 
also create an incentive for firms to adopt a stronger safety culture. 
Before proceeding, we note a caveat to the analysis. There are numerous ongoing 
investigations of the causes of the Deepwater Horizon spill, and there is no definitive assessment 
of whether an inadequate safety culture increased the likelihood of the spill or whether a stronger 
safety culture would significantly reduce the likelihood of future accidents. Furthermore, despite 
the growing management literature on high-reliability industries, there is no consensus about the 
characteristics that define a strong safety culture for deepwater drilling. Consequently, our 
objective is not to identify specific policies that would have prevented the Deepwater Horizon 
spill or to make recommendations on specific changes to safety culture that would prevent a 
major spill. Instead, we assess whether policies for promoting safety culture are economically 
justified and we analyze a range of policy changes, including the major ones currently under 
discussion. Although this analysis is necessarily qualitative, to the extent possible, we attempt to 
assess the likely significance of each policy. 
2. Literature Review and Theory of Safety Culture 
We present an overview of the safety culture literature and give a few examples of 
policies that indicate a strong safety culture in industries other than oil and gas production. We Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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then outline a theoretical structure for understanding why a firm selects a particular level of 
safety culture, and the economic justification for government policy intervention. 
2.1 Literature on Safety Culture in High-Risk Industries 
2.1.1 Background and Terminology 
Safety culture can be understood within the context of corporate culture, defined as “the 
ways work and authority are organized, the ways people are rewarded and controlled, as well as 
organizational features such as customs, taboos, company slogans, heroes and social rituals” 
(Brickley et al. 2007, 315). Safety culture refers to the features of a firm’s culture that 
specifically affect safety, both that of individual workers and that of processes that relate to the 
release of dangerous or environmentally harmful materials (sometimes called process safety; 
Baker et al. 2007). After the nuclear explosion at Chernobyl in 1986, an entire body of literature 
developed on the importance of a strong safety culture in high-risk industries. Specifically, that 
work focused on the underlying causes of catastrophic accidents and ways to avoid them.  
Organizations that operate relatively error-free in high-risk industries over a long period 
of time are termed high reliability organizations (HROs). Several researchers have identified 
characteristics of HROs through a combination of empirical studies, case studies, and application 
of theoretical frameworks to specific examples. Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) compiled a 
comprehensive list of qualities that HROs exhibit, including preoccupation with failure, 
reluctance to simplify interpretations, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, and 
deference to expertise. Weick and Sutcliffe provide examples of HROs from the railroad and 
mining industries. Hopkins (2008) focuses on three of the attributes listed above, citing constant 
worry about failure, reluctance to draw quick conclusions, and sensitivity to the experience of 
frontline operators as the major components of safety culture. Roberts and Bea (2001) expand on 
these elements and assert that HROs also aggressively seek out information, design their reward 
and incentive systems to recognize costs and benefits of failure versus reliability, and 
consistently foster communication among employees about the organization’s mission and where 
they fit in.  
Commonly agreed-upon characteristics of low-reliability organizations, or organizations 
prone to catastrophe, are cost cutting, lack of training, poor communication, poor supervision, 
and fatigue (DHSG 2010a). Some studies also cite disaggregation of responsibility and inflexible 
decisionmaking as contributing factors to disasters. A strong safety culture requires a balance 
between centralization and decentralization of decisionmaking, such that a “delegated capacity Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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for local detection must be held simultaneously with a centralized capacity that maintains the 
organization’s larger awareness of its vulnerability and serves to coordinate responses and 
learning that occur at the local level” (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001, 170). Weick and Sutcliffe 
(2001) find that an HRO must have flexible decisionmaking that allows for decisions to come 
from the top-level managers during stable times and further down during emergencies. Hopkins 
(2008) argues that complete decentralization does not allow operations managers to learn from 
incidents that top management might have stored away for future institutional reference.  
2.1.2 Why Aren’t All Firms HROs? 
The preceding discussion raises the question as to why all firms are not HROs. Hopkins 
(2008, 83) suggests that organizations do not always behave in their best interest because 
“organizations themselves don’t act—individuals within them do,” an observation that makes 
failure to invest in safety more understandable.  
In many cases, employees do not have the proper incentives to behave in manners 
consistent with an HRO. Executives may be pressured to perform quickly and cheaply and may 
perceive safety as less important.  
Information flow between individuals, particularly up and down the hierarchy, has also 
prevented firms from engaging in HRO behaviors. According to Hopkins (2008, 114), “Research 
shows that, prior to every major accident, information was available somewhere in the 
organization pointing to the fact that trouble was brewing, but this information failed to make its 
way upwards to people with the capacity and inclination to take effective action.” Top managers 
need to convey to all employees the importance of reporting all information, both positive and 
negative (Hopkins 2008). Thus, the literature suggests that some firms may not be HROs because 
upper management does not provide the correct incentives. Section 2.2 discusses reasons why 
that might occur. 
2.1.3 The Importance of Incentive Schemes 
Roberts and Bea (2001, 74) note that HROs: 
Seek to establish reward and incentive systems that balance the costs of 
potentially unsafe but short-run profitable strategies with the benefits of safe and 
long-run profitable strategies. They make it politically and economically possible 
for people to make decisions that are both short-run safe and long-run profitable. 
This is important to ensure that the focus of the organization is fixed on accident 
avoidance. When organizations focus on today’s profits without consideration of 
tomorrow’s problems, the likelihood of accidents increases. Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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Hopkins (2008) asserts that managers are driven not only by financial incentives but also 
by praise and criticism. Whether such corporate or social norms counteract or reinforce 
economic incentives is an empirical issue. It is widely acknowledged within the management 
literature that to instill a particular culture, performance evaluations and rewards must reinforce 
that culture. Hence, if cost cutting is more important than safety in a manager’s evaluation and 
reward structure, it would not be surprising to see safety taking second place to cost cutting. 
2.1.4 Measurement of Safety Culture 
Quantitative comparisons of safety cultures between firms, occupational groups, and even 
industries can be made using the safety attitudes questionnaire developed by Bryan Sexton, Eric 
Thomas, and Bob Helmreich. Originally designed for the health care industry, the questionnaire 
has been used to contrast the safety cultures of airlines and intensive-care units (Sexton et al. 
2000). The approach has also been applied to other high-risk industries, like nuclear power 
generation and, most recently, offshore oil drilling. 
A similar questionnaire was used in an analysis by Mearns et al. (2003) to ascertain 
whether there was a correlation between safety culture and accidents.2 Safety culture scales 
measure employees’ satisfaction with safety activities, involvement with safety planning, and 
safety communication, in addition to attitudinal questions about safety and the frequency of 
unsafe behavior. The paper reports an association between proficient safety management 
practices and low levels of official, OSHA-reported accidents and respondent-reported accidents. 
The authors note the challenges of interpreting the results as the causal effect of safety culture on 
accidents.  
2.1.5 Examples of Strong Safety Culture in High-Risk Industries 
A nuclear power plant is one example of a hazardous worksite where awareness of risk is 
central to avoiding catastrophes. For example, the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant exhibits 
qualities of an HRO by mandating that employees spend one week of every four in training. 
                                                 
2 Thirteen separately operated oil rigs were included in the study. Each rig was assessed based on its safety culture, 
safety management practices, and safety performance. Surveys were delivered and filled out by hand. Respondents 
answered questions using a five-point scale to indicate their agreement or satisfaction with a particular safety-related 
statement. Part 2 of the survey was a safety management questionnaire, which addressed safety management 
practices on each oil rig. Responses were collected in the same manner, and a coding scheme converted qualitative 
survey answers into quantitative data. Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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Frequent training prevents employees from becoming complacent and reinforces the idea that the 
organization strives to learn what it does not know (Roberts and Bea 2001).  
Aviation is another high-risk industry in which some organizations operate with high 
reliability. An often-cited example is the 1989 United Airlines flight that experienced an 
unprecedented emergency when a secondary engine exploded, cutting off the aircraft’s hydraulic 
power. The cockpit crew made an emergency landing in Sioux City, where a DC-10 had never 
landed before. Despite a malfunction in a crucial piece of firefighting equipment, more than half 
of the passengers on board survived because the emergency ground personnel had recently 
practiced how to safely land a DC-10. This is an example of an HRO training its employees to 
recognize and respond to irregularities, but confounding factors undermine the conclusion that 
this is a perfect example of an HRO. Because an instructor pilot who happened to be on board 
played a pivotal role in landing the disabled aircraft, it is difficult to discern to what extent the 
outcome was due to luck or a strong safety culture.  
Many airlines behave as high-reliability organizations, as evidenced by the expensive 
precautions they take to minimize risk (Roberts and Bea 2001). It is a subject of debate whether 
this is because airlines internally value a strong safety culture or are just complying with legal 
requirements. Laws mandate that there be two qualified pilots in the cockpit of a large 
commercial aircraft, two air traffic controllers monitoring the same skies, and multiple people 
directing the plane to its gate. These and other legal provisions force firms to adopt some HRO-
type behaviors, which they may or may not have adopted otherwise. Fraas et al. (2010, 11) find 
that the Federal Aviation Administration’s “site-specific and general environmental and safety 
management systems aim to strengthen safety cultures and accountability within firms, but these 
systems require periodic independent audits to evaluate their substance, their implementation, 
and their effectiveness in improving safety results.” 
Aircraft carriers operate in extremely dangerous conditions with little margin for error. 
To avoid disasters, U.S. Navy aircraft carriers build redundancy into their operations, such that 
there are more than 20 communications devices on board to ensure that the landing-signal officer 
is always connected to a commander in the control tower. Because the Navy “spend[s] money to 
create redundancy, there is no question in anyone’s mind that the organization believes it can’t 
know everything and must take the possibility of accidents seriously” (Roberts and Bea 2001, 
73–74), and thus a strong safety culture emerges. Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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2.1.6 Examples of Weak Safety Culture 
In theory, numerous disasters could have been avoided had organizations incorporated 
HRO tactics into their operations. For example, in 2006 an airplane crashed after taking off from 
the wrong runway in Lexington, Kentucky, because of confusion about taxi patterns due to 
construction. “A small group of aircraft maintenance workers told the investigators that they also 
had experienced confusion when taxiing to conduct engine tests—they worried that an accident 
could happen, but did not know how to effectively notify people who could make a difference” 
(Leveson 2010, 352). This example demonstrates the importance of information flows. 
Another avoidable incident occurred in 1986 when the space shuttle Challenger fell apart 
within the first two minutes of its flight. Hopkins (2007, 11) finds that “the decision to launch the 
Challenger space shuttle was made against the advice of the expert engineers.” Hopkins believes 
that had NASA employed flexible decisionmaking, which is crucial to HROs, the accident would 
have been avoided. 
Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) use the example of the Union Pacific–Southern Pacific 
railroad merger to illustrate potential repercussions of a weak safety culture. Union Pacific 
experienced several accidents, some fatal, directly after the merger, when its safety culture was 
in flux. At that time, errors were underreported or ignored until they were almost irreversible; top 
management was composed of people with homogeneous backgrounds who wanted to simplify 
operations; and any employee who relied on expertise to make decisions without explicit 
permission from supervisors was deemed insubordinate (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001). Thus Union 
Pacific failed to follow many of the essential HRO practices. 
Redundancy is cited as critical to a safety culture, but it is not always effective at 
preventing accidents. Occasionally, organizations incorporate HRO recommendations into their 
operations but still experience accidents. For example, in April 1999, a military communications 
satellite, Titan IV B-3, was launched into an incorrect, unusable orbit. The loss cost 
approximately $1.2 billion. Leveson (2010, 400) points out that in this instance “there were a 
large number of redundancies in each part of the process to prevent the loss, but they were not 
effective. Sometimes (as in this case), built-in redundancy itself causes complacency and 
overconfidence and is a critical factor in the accident process.” 
Similarly, in Miami in 1984, a Lockheed L-1011 lost oil pressure in all three engines 
simultaneously because two mechanics failed to install O-rings on the new engine oil plugs. As 
in the case of the Challenger space shuttle, “the failure of the primary O-ring led to the failure of Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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the secondary O-ring. Redundancy does not provide protection against underlying design errors, 
only random failures” (Marais et al. 2004, 11).  
Marais et al. (2004, 9) further argue that the simultaneously centralized and decentralized 
decisionmaking recommended for HROs “can lead to major accidents in complex socio-
technical systems.” For instance, before a ferry disaster at Zeebrugge, Belgium, “those making 
decisions about vessel design, harbor design, cargo management, passenger management, traffic 
scheduling, and vessel operation were unaware of the impact of their decisions on the others and 
the overall impact on the process,” even though they were all making their decisions properly 
according to HRO theory (Marais et al. 2004, 9). These examples suggest that becoming an HRO 
is more difficult than simply adopting each individual policy and procedure that the literature 
advocates. 
2.1.7 Safety Culture at BP 
Concerns about the safety culture at BP preceded the Deepwater Horizon spill. Numerous 
studies analyze the explosion at BP’s Texas City oil refinery in 2005. The U.S. Chemical Safety 
Board (CSB) released a landmark report in 2007 concluding that corporate culture caused the 
incident. The report asserts that senior executives did not adequately address major hazard risk or 
process safety performance. External audits conducted by GHSER (BP's Health, Safety and 
Environmental Management System Framework) and Telos (a provider of risk management and 
insurance broking services) in 2003–2005 concluded that “Texas City had serious deficiencies in 
identifying and controlling major risks” (U.S. CSB 2007, 184). An internal audit by BP in 2004 
concurred that “business unit managers’ risk management processes did not understand or 
control major hazards” across the corporation (U.S CSB 2007, 184). Furthermore senior 
executives did not provide effective safety culture leadership or oversight. Examples included 
“managers not following or ensuring enforcement of policies and procedures, responding 
ineffectively to a series of reports detailing critical process safety problems, and focusing on 
budget cutting goals that compromised safety” (U.S. CSB 2007, 187). In addition, BP managers 
“did not formally review the safety implications of policy changes such as cost-cutting strategy 
prior to making changes” (U.S. CSB 2007, 194).  
Above, we noted the importance of providing incentive schemes that encourage safety 
and long term profitability. At BP’s Texas City refinery, each employee received a bonus based 
on the overall performance of the refinery (U.S. CSB 2007). Fifty percent of the bonus was 
determined by “cost leadership,” or cost cutting, and only 10 percent was determined by safety—
calculated as OSHA-reported injuries, which are a measure of personal safety, not process safety. Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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The incentives were powerful: refinery managers could receive significant bonuses, up to 40 
percent of their salaries. Such incentives can create incentives to hide accidents. The Telos 
Group found that managers at Texas City would avoid reporting a frontline injury, sometimes by 
having the employee return to work immediately in a different capacity. The report includes an 
employee anecdote stating, “minor steam burn resulting in first aid visit; management 
encouraged self-treatment to avoid OSHA recordable injury” (Hopkins 2008, 86). Managers also 
had a high rate of turnover and were judged on their profitability. The short-term mentality 
combined with improper reward structures created a culture that did not value safety highly 
(Hopkins 2008). 
Hopkins (2008) adds that BP officials took for granted that they were being properly 
informed of audits’ results, did not heed warnings from their subordinates, and relied heavily on 
the observations of others rather than inspecting operations firsthand. External audits completed 
in 2002 and 2004 of Texas City produced strong, negative conclusions about BP’s safety culture, 
which were not reported to the chief executive (CE) of the refining and marketing businesses 
(Hopkins 2008). The CE stated in his deposition, “there were no audits which were coming to 
me, for instance, or, indeed, as I understand it, to [my immediate subordinate] which would have 
indicated the state of that plant” (Hopkins 2008, 111). In addition, BP received several warnings 
about danger at Texas City, including one from the health, safety and environment manager at 
Texas City a month before the explosion, who said “I would like for us to make these incidents 
our No. 1 priority …. I truly believe that we are on the verge of something bigger happening and 
that we must make critical decisions tomorrow morning over getting the workforce’s attention 
around safety” (Hopkins 2008, 71). Two investigations of Texas City concluded that the 
management team was “not connecting to the workforce in a meaningful way” and “management 
was generally unaware of local practices” (Hopkins 2008, 116). The CE did make a visit to 
Texas City in 2004 but did not inspect the plant, and spoke solely with management, not 
frontline workers. The management team he spoke with informed him that effective programs 
were being put in place, and he left with a positive impression of the safety efforts at Texas City. 
The CE assumed that management’s reporting was accurate and comprehensive and did not 
engage with the frontline workers. Essentially, BP was not an HRO because initiatives were not 
driven from the top (Hopkins 2008, 147).  
Communication between levels of management also appears to have affected BP’s safety 
culture. While Lord Browne was BP’s CEO (1995–2007), managers recalled, “only good news 
flowed upwards … no one dared say the wrong thing or challenge the boss” (Hopkins 2008, 
108). Tony Hayward, who succeeded Browne, added, “we have a leadership style that is too Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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directive and doesn’t listen sufficiently well. The top of the organization doesn’t listen 
sufficiently to what the bottom is saying” (Hopkins 2008, 109). 
After the Texas City incident, BP attempted to shift to an HRO culture. In July 2010, 
Robert Dudley (who became CEO in October 2010) said that “Tony [Hayward] started a cultural 
change three years ago, around a focus on safe and reliable operations. It is a fundamentally 
different company today than it was three years ago … we’ve now had this [Deepwater Horizon] 
incident: we need to accelerate that change in the culture inside the company” (Crooks 2010, 1). 
A 2009 financial risk management report stated that, “following the health & safety crisis, the 
company underwent a significant shift in its corporate culture which resulted in an integrated 
approach to safety within the organization” (RiskMetrics 2009, 5). Analysts expressed concern 
that this shift was not permanent: the 2010 report finds “our analysis of BP’s reported H & S 
[health and safety] statistics 2005-2009 indicates an improving trend from 2005-2009, which is 
most likely a function of BP management’s increased attention to EHS [environment, health and 
safety] …. However, from 2009, performance deteriorated” (RiskMetrics 2010, 2).  
Some reports have attributed the Deepwater Horizon spill in part to a weak safety culture. 
For example, the Deepwater Horizon Study Group (DHSG 2010a) finds that fatigue, poor 
communication, and lack of training characterized many BP employees in previous accidents, 
such as the Texas City explosion in 2005, and states suspicion that those characteristics also 
applied to the workers aboard the Deepwater Horizon oil rig.3 Interviews conducted prior to the 
spill reveal that employees aboard the rig “felt comfortable raising safety concerns and ideas for 
safety improvement to managers on the rig, but felt that they could not raise concerns at the 
Divisional or the Corporate level without reprisal” (Leveson 2010, 352). 
Following Deepwater Horizon, BP’s new management apparently recognized that 
previous changes were inadequate to ensure a safety culture. According to a BP press release, 
Dudley began to implement corporate safety changes even before he replaced Hayward. A new 
“Safety & Operational Risk” function will oversee and audit the company’s operations. The new 
group will have its own expert staff “embedded in BP operating units” and will report directly to 
                                                 
3Lots of finger-pointing has occurred since the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. For example, Jack Hackett, the CEO of 
Anadarko (BP’s partner on the Macondo well), even said, “the mounting evidence clearly demonstrates that this 
tragedy was preventable and the direct result of BP’s reckless decisions and actions—BP’s behavior and actions 
likely represent gross negligence or willful misconduct” (DHSG 2010, 10). Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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the CEO (BP 2010). BP will also restructure its upstream division into exploration, development, 
and production and will review incentives for safety and risk management. 
2.1.8 Summary of the Safety Culture Literature 
Before presenting a theoretical structure for analyzing government policies and safety, we 
list a few specific policies and procedures that researchers have suggested indicate a strong 
safety culture in other industries. These safety culture indicators may or may not be applicable to 
deepwater drilling, but they help ground the theoretical discussion that follows.  
The literature emphasizes that safety culture must be advocated by upper management. 
Consider a few specific policies and procedures that are adopted at firms with a strong safety 
culture:  
  redundancy; 
  compensation schemes, including bonuses, that emphasize safety performance; 
  hiring appropriately trained individuals and providing continual on-the-job training; and 
  regular analysis of how changes affect safety (i.e., management of change). 
Redundancy should be built into emergency preparation and day-to-day operations. A 
firm would have a stronger safety culture by requiring more than one qualified person to assess 
operations and having a variety of people at different management levels sign off on all 
operational changes. This would also guarantee a smooth information flow between senior 
executives, managers, and frontline workers.  
Compensation schemes play a central role in promoting a strong safety culture. Consider 
a firm whose managers’ compensation depends exclusively on the operating profits of their 
business units. Each manager will try to reduce costs even if doing so increases the number of 
accidents within the unit (as long as the accidents do not result in a larger increase in costs). In 
the case of Texas City, the Baker Panel recommended “making a significant portion of total 
compensation of refining line managers and supervisors contingent on satisfactorily meeting 
process safety performance indicators and goals”; a similar recommendation applied to 
nonmanagerial workers (Baker 2007, 251). Such changes should be implemented carefully in 
order to minimize the perverse incentives for reporting accidents that were noted above.  
Hiring well-trained workers and providing on-the-job training is also consistent with a 
strong safety culture. Both actions are likely to increase the costs of the firm, but they represent a 
prioritization of safety over short-term costs. Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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Many decisions made by employees affect safety, although the effects of these decisions 
are not readily apparent. Analyzing the effects of such decisions is costly to the firm, in terms of 
time and money. The willingness to pay the costs and undertake the analysis represents a 
prioritization of safety over costs, and is thus indicative of an HRO. 
2.2 Theoretical Framework for Evaluating Government Policy and Safety Culture 
Researchers have described the characteristics of firms with strong safety cultures but 
have not attempted to explain why some firms adopt a strong safety culture and others do not. 
More importantly for our purposes, despite some discussion about the disincentives for adopting 
a strong safety culture (for example, doing so is costly), they have not addressed directly the role 
for government policy. We therefore turn to the literature on corporate criminal behavior and the 
design of optimal sanctions to control illegal activities as the basis for our evaluation of potential 
government policies.4  
We begin by assuming that a firm engaged in deepwater drilling maximizes profits. For 
the moment, we assume there are no conflicts of interest between shareholders, managers, and 
other employees at the firm (i.e., there are no agency costs), so that the incentives within the firm 
are perfectly aligned. Consequently, decisions made by employees are always in the best interest 
of the firm’s profits. We also assume that the owners of the firm care only about profits and not 
about their personal reputations or the environmental consequences of their firm’s behavior. 
These assumptions are strong but will be relaxed later in the discussion.  
For convenience, we conceive of a firm choosing safety culture along a continuum. A 
particular level of safety culture represents the adoption of certain policies and procedures, such 
as those discussed above. One of the aims of this section is to characterize the factors that affect 
the desired level of safety culture. 
A profit-maximizing firm weighs the expected benefits of adopting a stronger safety 
culture against the expected costs. An example of a benefit is that a stronger safety culture 
reduces the likelihood of a catastrophe and the ensuing lawsuits; an example of a cost is the 
                                                 
4 Corporate crime can be modeled just like the decision to engage in any illegal activity or to avoid activities that are 
designed to prevent harmful activity (Cohen and Simpson 1997). Indeed, because of U.S. law and the nature of 
corporate criminal liability, virtually any oil spill in the U.S. subjects the responsible party to potential criminal 
liability—essentially at the discretion of government prosecutors. The underlying economic theory of why 
individuals commit unlawful activities is generally attributed to Becker (1968) and was expanded by Cohen (1992) 
to incorporate corporate environmental crimes. Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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higher wages that must be paid to workers who have more training. The following sections 
discuss at length the economic and policy factors that affect these costs and benefits. In short, 
individuals and firms choose the major elements of safety culture in response to economic, legal 
and other regulatory pressures. 
We adopt the standard perspective in welfare economics that government intervention 
may be justified if the private market does not lead to the socially desirable outcome (here, the 
socially optimal level of safety culture). That is, only in that case could government policy lead 
to an economically efficient outcome (the framework focuses on economic efficiency and does 
not consider distributional consequences of government policies). In the context of deepwater 
drilling, some benefits of adopting a strong safety culture may not be internalized by the firm. 
For example, society may not be compensated fully for environmental degradation (Krupnick et 
al. 2011). In this example, the social benefit of increasing safety culture exceeds the private 
benefit, in which case the firm will adopt a weaker safety culture than society would like. This 
constitutes the first justification for government intervention. It follows directly that policies that 
align the incentives of the public with those of the firm—that is, policies that internalize the 
externalities—would likely improve economic efficiency.  
Thus far, we have assumed away any conflicts within the firm, or the possibility that 
individuals within the firm care about anything other than profits. We now broaden the 
discussion by relaxing these assumptions.  
More specifically, we have assumed that the firm’s policies are actually carried out by its 
employees—something that is less and less likely as the firm expands and the cost of monitoring 
the actions of managers and employees increases. Firms engaged in deepwater oil and gas 
production certainly have such concerns—not only with employees but also with the many 
subcontractors they hire for exploration and production. This “principal-agent” relationship 
between owners and managers or between firms and subcontractors causes a divergence of 
interests that may result in more (or fewer) precautions to prevent a catastrophic event than the 
owner of the firm would prefer.5 Because of this divergence of interests, the firm’s owners will 
decide what ex ante training programs, internal monitoring policies, and so forth to put in place, 
and what ex post rewards and punishments, such as monetary compensation, promotions or 
firings, and nonpecuniary benefits of the job, to give its managers and employees.  
                                                 
5 Alexander and Cohen (1996) model this divergence between owners and managers of the firm in the context of 
corporate crime and estimate the extent to which crime is likely to be the outcome of this divergence of interests. Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
18 
To illustrate, assume for simplicity that there is only one owner and one manager of the 
firm. The owner (principal) hires the manager (agent), who has the expectation of earning a 
reasonable wage. Suppose further that there are two ways to achieve a given level of profit: one 
that involves designing and enforcing a safety culture and one that does not.6 Society desires a 
safety culture because of the lower probability of a catastrophic spill, but suppose, for the 
moment, that such a spill would not affect the firm’s profits (i.e., the costs of the spill are not 
internalized). The safety culture requires more work on the part of the manager, whereas the 
absence of a safety culture results in the same profits but requires significantly less time and 
work. Thus, the manager can increase “leisure time” and work fewer hours (or otherwise 
increase perks on the job) while maintaining the owner’s profits.  
For comparison, suppose that firms are held liable for accidents attributed to not having 
an adequate safety culture (i.e., the costs of such accidents are fully internalized by the owner), 
such that the social and private benefits of safety culture are the same. In this case, the owner 
would clearly prefer the safety culture, and there is a divergence of interests between owner and 
manager. In the extreme, where the owner cannot observe the manager’s actions and the manager 
is not held personally liable for unsafe activities, the outcome is clear: the manager will shirk 
even though the owner wants a strong safety culture. Although this simplification ignores some 
other possible constraints on the manager’s action, such as moral inhibition, the point is that as 
long as the owner cannot perfectly monitor the daily actions of the manager, there is a risk that 
the manager will not adopt a safety culture because the costs outweigh the benefits. 
Given the above scenario, we would expect the owner of the firm to put mechanisms in 
place to align his own incentives with those of his manager. These mechanisms might involve 
costly monitoring devices, such as internal audits, extra layers of management approval for 
certain actions, or random third-party inspections. The owner might also include monetary 
incentives or promotion to a manager whose unit achieves certain levels of performance and 
demotions or dismissal of a manager whose unit does not. Of course, if the owner wants to 
encourage unsafe behavior, the opposite incentives might be put in place. Ultimately, although 
the owner may not be directly involved in day-to-day decisions by the manager, his decisions on 
the size and intensity of internal compliance programs, compensation and performance 
evaluation processes, strategic plans, and so forth may be thought of as choosing a “probability” 
                                                 
6 In the principal-agent discussion, we refer to safety culture as an either-or decision—either the firm has one or it 
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that the manager (agent) pursues an unsafe culture. Because such policies are costly, the owner 
may choose a probability of safety culture that is less than the socially desirable level. 
To summarize the preceding discussion of principal-agent theory, even if social and 
private benefits (i.e., to the owner) of safety culture are equal, the firm may not adopt a safety 
culture because of agency costs. This is consistent with Hopkins’ (2008) argument, noted above, 
that employees may not always act in the firm’s best interests. Similarly, the level of safety 
culture may be less than socially optimal if the social and private benefits to the agent are equal, 
but the owner benefits less from safety culture than does the agent. Agency problems thus create 
a second potential justification for government policy.  
Note that information plays an important role in the principal-agent theory, because it is 
the owner’s inability to observe the manager’s actions that increases the owner’s costs of 
incentivizing the manager to adopt a safety culture. Below we consider the implications of other 
aspects of information that affect safety culture, including whether the owner knows how to 
instill a strong safety culture. 
The final consideration is that individuals may care about other things besides a firm’s 
profits. The corporate crime literature discusses quality of life, reputation, self-respect, moral 
inhibitions, and aversion to jail time and fines. As noted above, Hopkins (2008) finds that praise 
and criticism, and not just financial compensation, affect a manager’s decisions. Once these other 
factors are considered, a firm may adopt a higher safety culture than society desires—if, for 
example, the firm’s owner has an extremely strong preference for environmental quality. 
Furthermore, individuals and firms differ in many of these aspects. Because the costs and 
benefits of a safety culture may vary both by firm and by individual, the level of safety culture 
may vary across firms within an industry and it may vary across business units within a firm.  
In summary, (1) day-to-day decisions about whether to implement a safety culture are the 
consequence of individual choices; (2) individual choices are affected by economic and policy 
incentives; and (3) the interests of owners, managers, and employees may not be aligned. In this 
setting, there are two potential justifications for government policy: (a) the firm may not fully 
internalize the social benefits of adopting a strong safety culture; and (b) agency problems may 
cause the firm to adopt a weaker safety culture than if the agency problems did not exist. Section 
4 evaluates policies that would affect safety culture. Before beginning that discussion, however, 
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3. Economic Incentives for Safety Culture 
Several factors put pressure on a firm to adopt a stronger or weaker safety culture.  
3.1 Does the Market Punish a Poor Safety Record?  
Consumers and investors are often mentioned as two forces that might have an important 
influence on firms that have a poor safety record. If consumers thought that a firm’s safety 
record posed a risk to them directly through product quality or safety concerns, this would no 
doubt be priced into the firm’s product and would have a significant effect on a firm’s behavior.  
In the case of oil production, however, production risks do not translate into lower-
quality oil. Instead, it is possible that because many consumers care about the environment, some 
may decide to purchase products based on their perception of the company’s safety or 
environmental record. They may want to send a message to a firm with a weak safety record, or 
they may derive some nonmonetary value from punishing such firms. In other words, consumers 
might be willing to pay a higher price or switch to a lower-quality or less convenient brand. 
Survey research finds that some U.S. consumers are willing to pay such a premium.7  
There is also anecdotal evidence in the United States (and in Europe) that consumers 
have boycotted petroleum companies, including Shell (following the Brent Spar incident), Exxon 
(following the Exxon Valdez accident), and BP (following the Deepwater Horizon spill) (Tye 
1989). Although the effect of these boycotts is generally temporary and of limited geographic 
and/or demographic scope, they can affect short-term profits. For example, “A consumer boycott 
of Shell products, organized by Greenpeace and the Green Party, hit particularly hard in 
Germany, where sales dropped by 30%” (Neale 1997, 99). At least in the case of the Brent Spar 
incident, consumer boycotts were apparently significant enough to be a major contributing factor 
leading to a change in corporate policy (Neale 1997). Indeed, after the Deepwater Horizon 
incident, anecdotal evidence suggests there were significant and painful boycotts by consumers 
against branded BP oil—something that appears to have hurt small business owners as much as 
BP (Neuman 2010). Clearly, this is more relevant for vertically integrated companies, like BP, 
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probably pay up to 15% more for environmentally friendly laundry detergent, computer printer paper, automobiles, 
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than for deepwater drilling companies that do not have branded products and do not participate 
in retail markets.  
Reputation can provide incentives for adopting a strong safety culture.	Information that a 
firm has been sanctioned for violating environmental laws may be of interest to shareholders or 
lenders if the monetary sanction reduces the expected value of the firm and thus its share price or 
bond rating. It may also give lenders and insurers pause about risking more capital on that 
particular firm.8 Other costs to having a weak safety culture might include debarment from future 
government contracts and targeted enforcement by regulatory agencies. 
Several studies looking at bad environmental news, such as oil or chemical spills or the 
announcement of civil or criminal enforcement actions, have demonstrated a negative stock price 
effect. Because stock prices are generally thought to represent the market’s best estimate of 
future profitability, if the stock price reduction exceeds the expected cost of penalties and 
cleanup, this could be attributed to a “reputation” penalty. However, most studies fail to find any 
reputational penalty from environmental violations: stock prices appear to decline roughly by the 
same amount as the value of the direct cost to the firm, including cleanup costs, tort liability, 
government-imposed sanctions, etc. (Jones and Robin 2001; Karpoff et al. 2005). For example, 
Jones et al. (1994) studied the effect of the Exxon Valdez spill on Exxon’s stock price and 
estimated a cost to shareholders of $4.7 billion to $11.3 billion—within the range of estimates of 
the ultimate cost to Exxon of the spill itself.	
3.2 Lack of Appropriate Information 
For markets to work efficiently, decisionmakers must have adequate information. There 
are several ways that imperfect information prevents the establishment of appropriate 
compensation schemes and other elements of a strong safety culture. First, even if it would be 
profitable for the firm to adopt a strong safety culture, upper managers may not know what 
policies to put in place. For example, in the Texas City accident, by focusing on worker injuries 
rather than problems at the system level, managers may not use the appropriate safety metrics 
(U.S. CSB 2007). Since the Deepwater Horizon spill, there has been a lot of interest in 
developing safety metrics that can be used to predict the possibility of a future accident (Cooke 
et al. 2011). 
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This argument could be pushed further to say that there is no need for government 
intervention. Suppose it is profitable to adopt a strong safety culture, but some firms do not know 
how to adopt it. Furthermore, assume the market is competitive, such that high-cost firms will 
eventually exit the industry. In that case, market pressures will cause the firms with a weak 
safety culture to exit, and in the long run the likelihood of a major accident should be very low 
because all firms that remain in the industry will have a strong safety culture.  
There are two problems with this argument, however. First, a large number of major 
accidents may occur before market pressures drive out the firms with poor safety culture. 
Because of the high external costs of such accidents, this is clearly not a desirable outcome from 
the public’s perspective. Second, government intervention may be needed precisely because 
some firms do not know how to adopt a strong safety culture. The government could raise the 
cost of failing to adopt a strong safety culture, which would hasten the exit of firms that do not 
know how to implement it, or the government could increase the incentive for them to learn. This 
type of policy is discussed in more detail below. 
Another type of information problem is that firm managers might simply not have 
adequate information about the expected cost of not adopting a strong safety culture. In 
particular, firm managers might not have adequate information about the probability of a spill or 
its potential magnitude. Before the Deepwater Horizon spill, the risk model used by industry and 
government indicated that the most likely size of a large spill at the Macondo well was 4,600 
barrels and no more than 26,000 barrels over the entire 40-year life of production activity on six 
leases, including the Macondo well—a fraction of the nearly 5 million barrels of oil actually 
spilled (Scarlett et al. 2011). Thus, to the extent that the expected cost of not adopting a safety 
culture is underestimated, firms are likely to underinvest in a safety culture. 
3.3 Conflicts of Interest between Shareholders and Managers  
A particularly salient information problem is that shareholders or managers may not have 
sufficient information to monitor employees’ safety-related decisions. As discussed in Section 
2.2, there is an inherent conflict of interest between shareholders and top management of a 
company. This conflict is most apparent in large, publicly traded companies, but it is also evident 
in any organization where top managers are not the owners of the firm. Of particular interest for 
our paper, shareholders may have a greater interest in safety and environment when a manager’s 
compensation is linked to short-term profits (such as performance bonuses). The manager’s 
decisions increase short term profits by reducing safety while decreasing long-run profits by 
exposing the firm to liability from a catastrophic spill. Managers may simply shirk on their Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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responsibility to provide an adequate safety culture because doing so takes significant effort and 
it is difficult for shareholders to monitor their behavior. The corporate governance literature 
focuses on mechanisms designed to overcome these conflicts of interest. 
A review of the corporate governance literature noted:  
The fundamental insight from the field of corporate governance is that 
there are potential problems associated with the separation of ownership and 
control that is inherent in the modern corporate form of organization. Corporate 
governance, then, encompasses the set of institutional and market mechanisms 
that induce self-interested managers (the controllers) to maximize the value of the 
residual cash flows of the firm on behalf of its shareholders (the owners). (Denis 
2001, 192) 
The corporate governance literature generally considers four mechanisms by which 
managerial effort can be aligned more closely with shareholders (Jensen 1993): (1) legal and 
regulatory mechanisms; (2) internal control mechanisms; (3) external control mechanisms; and 
(4) product market competition. None of these mechanisms is perfect, as each comes with its 
own costs. Although government actions might affect the external control and product market 
mechanisms, the most direct way in which the government affects governance is through the first 
two mechanisms. 
Numerous laws and regulations at both the state and federal levels are designed to align 
the interests of shareholders and managers—that is, to protect shareholders. For example, 
although a board of directors has many protections from shareholder lawsuits, the board may be 
vulnerable to shareholder derivative lawsuits if there is a serious conflict of interest or if they did 
not take due care in arriving at a decision that has a major effect on corporate performance. The 
standards for such lawsuits are very high, however, and it might take gross negligence or 
willfully ignoring signs of mismanagement, for example, on the part of a board, to become 
personally liable for shareholder losses due to a catastrophic spill. Many of the laws and 
regulations dealing with internal controls refer to transparency and the provision of adequate 
information so that investors can properly estimate the firm’s future profitability. Thus, if a board 
knew about a serious material risk to the firm (e.g., safety standards that were significantly below 
industry standards) and failed to inform investors, it could be in violation of securities laws.  
The literature on internal controls has considered the makeup of the board of directors, 
executive compensation, and the role of large institutional investors. Managers are more likely to 
be aligned with shareholders when the board has a significant number of independent, or outside, 
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personal or business ties to its managers. In well-designed governance structures, only outside 
directors can be members of the board’s compensation and audit committees.  
Traditional executive compensation schemes may reduce incentives for a strong safety 
culture. Past research has concluded that managers are more likely to act in shareholders’ 
interests if doing so results in greater compensation. Managerial compensation generally includes 
a significant performance-based component, which often depend on short-term profit goals. Even 
though a top manager might lose his or her job in the event of a catastrophic spill, the downside 
risk is generally not very large relative to the upside potential for significant earnings based on 
short-term profitability. Attempts have been made to increase the time period over which stock 
options are granted and/or vested in order to lengthen the time horizon of top managers. 
However, there is general agreement that the board of directors has an important role in 
monitoring the long-term strategic focus of managers to ensure that their incentives are aligned 
better with the interests of shareholders. Thus, for example, it is thought that firms with board-
level environment or safety committees and managerial compensation tied to observable 
measures of environmental protection or safety culture may exhibit stronger environmental 
performance or safety culture.9 
Empirical evidence suggests that corporate crime is more likely to be committed by firms 
whose managers and shareholders are not fully aligned (Alexander and Cohen 1999) and—
especially for environmental crimes—by firms that are relatively weak financially (Alexander 
and Cohen 1996). Similar findings come from Kassinis and Vafeas (2001), who report that 
corporate boards can be an important factor in determining corporate environmental 
performance. Findings like these might help target government monitoring and enforcement 
efforts—focusing them on firms that are at highest risk of a catastrophic spill. They might also 
be another justification for financial responsibility requirements (see Section 4): firms that are 
relatively weak are not only less able to cover the costs of a spill, they are also more likely to 
have spills.  
The government does not often take a direct role in specifying internal controls, but laws 
such as Sarbanes-Oxley require disclosure of internal controls and any factors that might prevent 
the firm from accurately reporting financial results. It appears that Sarbanes-Oxley had a positive 
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effect on firms that had previously been below industry standards for shareholder disclosures, 
suggesting that such requirements might give shareholders information not otherwise disclosed 
by top management. For example, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) found that firms not 
already in compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley requirements saw their value rise relative to 
competitors that were already in or near compliance when the law was passed. They suggest that 
the market expected the law to improve the performance of those firms. They also state, 
however, that this trend did not hold true for smaller firms, which implies that some provisions 
of Sarbanes-Oxley will be detrimental to small firms—and in fact, there is some evidence that 
firms have been reluctant to go public because of the cost of complying with Sarbanes-Oxley. 
What is the evidence that shareholders care more than managers about safety and 
reducing the risk of a catastrophic spill? That corporate offenders are less likely to have 
managers aligned with shareholders (Alexander and Cohen 1999) is one piece of evidence: if 
crime “paid” for shareholders, we would likely see more offenses in firms whose top 
management was closely aligned with shareholders. Why would shareholders accept this higher 
risk from some firms? One reason might simply be lack of information—and indeed, in the case 
of deepwater drilling, investors are unlikely to know more about the risks of a catastrophic spill 
than either government or industry experts. Of course, the corollary is that now that the risks are 
better known, investors will take this into account. However, this still assumes that investors 
have adequate information about the relative risks of each firm in the industry. Nonfinancial 
rating firms do provide some of this information to investors, with analyses that focus on 
nonfinancial risks and opportunities. We previously mentioned one example, RiskMetrics, whose 
analysts had closely followed safety culture at BP and other oil and gas companies. Such 
information, especially with respect to drilling safety culture, may now be followed more 
carefully by mainstream investors.  
3.4 Conflicts of Interest between Firm and Subcontractor 
Public discussion about the relative liability of BP and its subcontractors raises the 
question of whether incentives are properly aligned between the firm (lease operator) and the 
subcontractors (such as the drilling contractor). For example, BP may have had stronger safety 
culture incentives than the drilling subcontractor because BP was more concerned about 
consumer backlash in its product markets (see Section 3.1). On the other hand, if the 
subcontractor has more workers on the rig than does the lease operator, the subcontractor may 
have stronger safety culture incentives. In either case, misaligned incentives could cause 
investment in safety culture that from the public’s perspective is insufficient. This concern Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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motivates recent proposals for the government to mandate interfacing documents and safety and 
environmental management systems (see Section 4.3). 
Although the literature does not provide clear evidence of conflicts of interest between 
lease operators and subcontractors in deepwater drilling, this may not be a significant problem in 
practice. First, if the lease operator has a much stronger incentive for safety culture than the 
subcontractor, the operator could actively monitor; if monitoring proves too expensive, the firm 
could undertake the activity itself. Note that this is more likely for larger firms, which might find 
it less costly to perform more of the drilling-related tasks in-house. 
Second, liability law makes it unlikely for incentives to become significantly misaligned. 
As discussed further in the next section, the operator is liable for the costs of the spill, but it can 
sue the subcontractors to recover at least some of those costs. The liability regime does not imply 
that the incentives of the two firms are perfectly aligned, because the firm would have to 
establish that the subcontractor was negligent, which may prove difficult in practice. 
Nonetheless, the subcontractor faces potential lawsuits if it causes an accident by underinvesting 
in safety culture.  
Reputational effects may play an important role in keeping incentives aligned. The 
operator may observe the subcontractor’s safety culture directly from interacting repeatedly on 
different well operations (Corts and Singh, 2004). The operator could rely upon its own 
experience or industry-wide reputation to choose subcontractors. Furthermore, reputation and 
repeated interactions could create strong safety culture incentives at subcontractors, because the 
firm would lose future business if it contributes to an accident.  
4. Analysis of Policies That Affect Safety Culture 
Sections 4.1–4.5 discuss the effects on safety culture of five government policies: 
liability, financial responsibility, mandatory insurance, government oversight, and risk-based 
drilling fees. Section 4.6 discusses interactions between the policies, Section 4.7 summarizes the 
main features of these policies, and Section 4.8 lists the main findings from the preceding 
discussion. Our policy recommendations are reserved for Section 5. 
The following discussion focuses on the effect of the policies on safety culture. We do 
not consider the broader policy question of whether to allow drilling at all and instead assume 
that decision has already been made. Also, we do not consider compensation issues related to 
liability. Setting a liability cap below worst-case social damages means that either victims of a Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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spill will not be compensated or the public will pay via higher taxes (Krupnick et al. 2011). This 
is a central issue to oil spill policy, but it is beyond the scope of this paper. 
4.1 Liability 
While damage to equipment and loss of valuable hydrocarbons are costs of spills borne 
by firms themselves, whether the associated environmental and economic costs are also borne by 
firms depends on the legal regime. An important method by which firms are made to internalize 
the environmental and economic costs associated with a spill—and therefore are given incentives 
to invest in preventing or reducing damages—is tort liability. In the event of a spill, public and 
private claimants can sue firms that spill (“responsible parties”) and seek recovery of economic 
or natural resources damages. These suits may sometimes be brought under (common) tort law 
or under federal or state statutes. In addition to litigation to recover damages, state and federal 
government agencies might bring administrative, civil or criminal charges against a responsible 
party and seek to impose a fine or other nonmonetary sanction (such as debarment or probation).  
The possibility of such legal actions creates an incentive for a responsible party to adopt a 
stronger safety culture to reduce the probability and severity of a spill. The greater is the liability 
exposure, the greater the extent to which firms internalize costs, and the greater the incentive for 
a strong safety culture. Section 2.2 concluded that policies should be calibrated to internalize the 
social cost of a spill. Therefore, for the purpose of promoting the socially desirable level of 
safety culture, a firm’s potential liability under the law should be equal to the expected social 
harm of the worst-case spill (see finding 1, in Section 4.6). We note that liability includes 
administrative, civil and criminal sanctions.10 
In practice, three factors limit the amount a responsible party would pay after a spill, 
which limits the safety culture incentive that liability creates. The first is that legal costs may 
prevent some of the harmed individuals from suing. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90)11 is 
                                                 
10 The firm’s total liability should not exceed the expected social harm as this could induce more than the socially 
optimal level of safety culture resulting in firms taking costly precautions beyond what society deems appropriate 
See Cohen (1987) for an analysis of the optimal government penalty for preventing oil spills. While this penalty is 
generally higher than the social harm as it must take into account the probability of detection, in the case of a 
catastrophic spill where detection is certain, the penalty should just equal the social harm. From an efficiency 
standpoint, this analysis is no different under criminal law – although other goals such as punishment or 
incapacitation might come into play under criminal law; see Cohen (1999). 
11 33 U.S.C. §2701 et seq. Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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the primary statute governing liability for spills, although it explicitly does not preempt state law 
(or other federal laws).12 As a result, plaintiffs can file suits seeking recovery of spill damages 
either in federal district court under OPA 90 or in state court under either common law or 
applicable state statutory law.13 However, petroleum exploration, production, and transportation 
are complex industries, with a large number of firms, complex contractual relationships, and 
advanced technology understood only by experts. These factors can make litigation over 
damages claims very complex and costly.  
To reduce this complexity, oil spill liability law generally uses channeling and strict 
liability.14 Both mechanisms have strong foundations in the economic theory of enforcement 
literature (see, e.g., Cohen 1999).  
Channeling is the identification, before litigation, of a particular party that will be the 
defendant in an action to recover spill-related damages. Since drilling operations typically 
involve several partners and contractors, it might be difficult in the absence of channeling 
provisions to identify which party to sue in the event of a spill. OPA 90 makes the holder of the 
drilling permit the responsible party for spills from offshore platforms.  
In addition to simplifying litigation, channeling creates incentives for a responsible party 
to select and monitor partners and subcontractors with care, since it is ultimately responsible for 
damage claims. Channeling does not prevent the responsible party from recovering damages 
from other parties, such as lease partners or contractors. 
Strict liability plays an important role in reducing legal costs. In suits seeking 
compensation for spill-related damages under OPA 90 and some state statutes, plaintiffs need not 
show that the defendant was negligent. Plaintiffs must show that they suffered some damage 
(economic damage, physical injury, or natural resources damage) and that this damage was 
caused by a spill by the responsible party. Whether that firm is “at fault” or took care to prevent 
                                                 
12 Because of this nonpreemption clause, OPA 90 sets a liability floor, not a ceiling. States can deviate upward but 
not downward: they can implement higher liability caps (or none at all) or higher financial responsibility 
requirements, but cannot go lower. 
13 The reasons why a plaintiff might choose one venue over another are complex and largely beyond the scope of 
this analysis, but they include recovery beyond the liability limits in OPA 90 and access to the channeling and strict 
liability provisions of federal law (discussed below). 
14 OPA 90 and some state laws, such as Louisiana’s Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act, feature channeling and 
strict liability provisions, but these features are not available in state common law actions. Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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the spill is not relevant. Strict liability therefore has the advantage of greatly simplifying 
litigation and the cost to the government in particular. Generally speaking, legal scholars argue 
that strict liability is appropriate where it is easy to identify in advance which party can most 
readily avoid damages15; in the case of spills, this is almost certainly the responsible party.16 
Together, channeling and strict liability can simplify spill-related litigation and reduce 
legal costs. This increases firms’ expected liability as reduced costs for plaintiffs make more 
suits possible and influence their settlement terms. Litigation ensuing from large spills remains 
highly complex, however, in part because of the number of victims (and therefore plaintiffs). 
Class-action lawsuits reduce the cost of litigation but are still very expensive and may take a long 
time. This complexity and the associated costs and burden on the judicial system have driven 
efforts, such as the $20 billion Gulf Coast Claims Facility, to satisfy damages claims without 
litigation. In addition, litigation under state common law does not benefit from either channeling 
or strict liability; plaintiffs must name a defendant and, generally, show negligence in order to 
recover.  
Besides legal costs, there is a second limitation to a responsible party’s expected liability: 
statutory liability caps. For example, for offshore facilities like Deepwater Horizon, OPA 90 
imposes a liability cap for spill damages at $75 million. OPA also limits liability in the case of 
natural disaster, war, or certain actions taken by third parties.17  
OPA 90’s liability caps are not as firm in practice as a cursory reading of the statute 
would indicate, however (Richardson 2010). First, they are qualified by the statute itself: OPA 
90 caps do not apply to cleanup costs and are waived in cases of gross negligence or a violation 
of applicable regulations.18 The latter exception seems quite broad; many spills are likely to 
involve some violation, and if a violation, no matter how trivial, is discovered, the cap is 
removed.  
                                                 
15 See, for example, Gilles (1992). Farnsworth (2007) has an excellent discussion of this issue for the general reader. 
16 Strict liability also creates incentives to search for better safety technologies than a negligence standard because a 
negligence standard would only impose penalties if current standards of care are not adopted. On the other hand, if 
under strict liability the potential penalty from a large spill is so great that a small firm would declare bankruptcy, 
strict liability might cause such a firm to take less care than under a negligence standard. See Shavell (1980); Cohen 
(1987, 1992,2010). As we discuss in section 4.2, sufficient financial responsibility requirements should prevent this 
from occurring.  
17 OPA 90, 33 U.S.C. §2703(a). 
18 OPA 90, 33 U.S.C. §2704(c). Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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Second, OPA 90 does not preempt state or other federal law.19 Table 1 summarizes state 
laws regarding oil spill liability. To the extent that these laws do not include damages caps, a 
case brought under them (or under common law) is not subject to OPA 90 caps. In the Gulf of 
Mexico, Florida, Mississippi, Alabama, and Texas either do not have specific statutes governing 
oil spill liability, or their statutes do not set caps on liability. However, suits to recover spill 
damages in these states’ courts may not benefit from the channeling and strict liability provisions 
available under federal law, making litigation more costly and recovery more difficult. Plaintiffs 
therefore face a difficult choice. 
 
Table 1. Major Provisions of State Oil Spill Liability Laws in the Gulf of Mexico20 
State 
Liability for spill 
damages 
Notes  Strict Cap 
Florida  Y  N  Removal costs capped by statute; damages not capped 
Alabama  N  N  Common law negligence regime 
Mississip N  N  Strict liability for removal costs, negligence regime for damages 
Louisiana  Y  Y  Cap at same level as OPA 90 
Texas Y  N   
Drilling firms’ exposure to damages liability to private plaintiffs21 is much greater under 
most states’ laws than it is under OPA 90. In fact, two states—Texas and Florida—allow 
uncapped strict liability for spill damages. Louisiana does, however, cap liability. The Louisiana 
Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act22 mirrors OPA 90 in many respects, including its liability 
caps. As a result, damages to Louisiana residents and Louisiana natural resources are subject to 
the liability caps in the two statutes. Private plaintiffs will find it difficult or impossible to evade 
the effect of the caps. To do so, they may have to show gross negligence or a regulatory 
violation. Because so many drilling operations take place near Louisiana, the state’s cap may 
significantly lower the costs a responsible party would pay after a spill. 
                                                 
19 Ibid. at §2718(a). 
20 See Louisiana Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act, La. Rev. Stat. 30:2451 et seq.; Waldron (2010). 
21 Despite the OPA 90 damages caps, the federal government can recover damages and cleanup costs from 
responsible parties via a variety of other legal methods, including suit under other statutes, civil penalties, or 
settlement under threat of criminal prosecution. 
22 La. Rev. Stat. 30:2451 et seq. Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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Outside Louisiana, OPA 90 caps are not binding. Besides the possibility of lawsuits in 
state courts, the government can use the threat of criminal or civil penalties to compel a 
settlement regardless of OPA 90 caps, a legal strategy used in the Exxon Valdez spill. BP’s 
decision to fund claims for compensation of victims, in lieu of litigation, up to levels far beyond 
the OPA 90 cap suggests that the firm believes the cap would not significantly limit its liability, 
though this move may also be influenced by political and public relations considerations (see 
Section 3.1).  
On the other hand, liability caps do affect where plaintiffs sue and may block plaintiffs’ 
access to the favorable strict liability and channeling provisions available in an OPA 90 suit. In 
states like Louisiana, where common law actions for spill damages are replaced by state statutes 
with their own damages caps, recovery by private plaintiffs beyond the caps may be difficult or 
impossible. Liability caps may also restrict avenues available to plaintiffs and/or raise litigation 
costs, reducing the number of cases firms must defend and the amounts they must pay in 
settlements. Some types of damages may also be recoverable only under federal maritime law (as 
modified by OPA 90), and not under state law. Drilling firms’ liability exposure from these kinds 
of claims would be firmly limited by the OPA 90 cap. 
We conclude that although the federal liability cap is far below worst-case damages from 
drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, the liability caps in OPA 90 are not generally binding because of 
other provisions in state and federal law. However, the caps do likely reduce the aggregate 
expected damages payments from a spill to some degree (unless they are waived, as BP has said 
it has done), with corresponding effects on safety incentives (see finding 2). 
The third limitation of liability is that the public may not be able to recover the full social 
cost of the spill. Certain types of lawsuits are precluded due to the difficulty of establishing 
proximate cause, for example, recovering public health costs or payment for mental anguish to 
economic victims of a spill. In the case of the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, claims are limited to 
certain economic costs. Therefore, firms do not appear to fully internalize social costs when 
choosing safety culture; we note that this would be the case even if liability caps were removed 
entirely as this limitation is inherent in the tort liability system itself, not in liability caps or any 
specific policy (see Krupnick et al. 2011). 
4.2 Financial Responsibility 
Up to this point, we have assumed that responsible parties pay any damages awards made 
by courts, and that exposure to the full risk of liability will influence safety decisions. But in Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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reality, firms’ resources are not unlimited. The ability to declare bankruptcy limits a firm’s 
exposure to risk. Specifically, a responsible party that is too small to adequately compensate 
victims of a worst-case spill lacks incentives to make sufficient investments in safety: there is no 
reason to prevent spills that cause damages that exceed its ability to pay. The remaining costs of 
the spill would then fall on spill victims or the public at large. In fact, this consideration suggests 
that firms have an incentive to be small, to avoid the costs that a larger firm would incur by 
adopting a stronger safety culture. This problem—in legal terms, that of the judgment-proof 
tortfeasor—is not unique to oil spills, but it is particularly salient given their large costs. Thus the 
possibility of bankruptcy implies that, in the absence of insurance, liability from a spill creates an 
incentive for safety culture that is limited by the value of the firm’s assets (see finding 3). 
 A partial solution to this problem is requiring a demonstration of financial responsibility 
(FR) (Boyd 2001). The basic idea is simple: to engage in activities that expose outside parties to 
risks, a firm must demonstrate that it has sufficient resources—either its own (self-insurance) or 
third-party insurance coverage—to compensate those parties in the event of an accident.  
OPA 90 establishes FR for petroleum firms. For offshore facilities, the statute requires 
that firms make a $35 million demonstration, subject to increase by the President up to a 
maximum of $150 million.23 Regulations of the Minerals Management Service (MMS, now the 
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, BOEMRE) include 
guidelines for the level of FR necessary, based on the estimated worst-case discharge from 
offshore facilities. The highest level of FR demonstration—the statutory maximum of $150 
million—is required for facilities whose worst-case discharge volume exceeds 105,000 barrels.24 
A firm’s FR demonstration is equal to the highest level required by any one of its wells.25  
In principle, the FR requirement for a given activity should be sufficiently high to cover 
the costs of the worst-case spill associated with that activity. If requirements are lower, the 
judgment-proof spiller problem is mitigated but not eliminated. Offshore drilling firms capable 
of demonstrating only $35 million to $150 million of FR are unable to cover damages associated 
                                                 
23 40 U.S.C. §2716(c). Note that firms with more than one facility need show financial responsibility for only the 
facility with the highest requirement. A firm with 10 offshore drilling platforms, for example, must demonstrate only 
$35 million, not $350 million. 
24 See U.S. Department of Interior, Minerals Management Service, Oil Spill Financial Responsibility for Offshore 
Facilities, 63 FR 42714. 
25 Ibid. Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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with spills that exceed these levels. These firms therefore lack liability-driven incentives to 
invest in preventing such spills. Limiting FR in OPA 90 to $35 million to $150 million is broadly 
consistent with capping liability at $75 million, however.26 
But, as discussed above, the actual liability for a firm drilling in the Gulf of Mexico is 
potentially far greater than the liability cap in OPA 90. The result is that current FR requirements 
are far lower than both the expected damages associated with a worst-case spill and the expected 
liability associated with such a spill. In this sense, it is fortunate that BP and not a smaller firm 
was the responsible party for the Deepwater Horizon spill.27 Many smaller drilling firms would 
have been unable to cover the multibillion-dollar liability and would have gone bankrupt. Such 
firms would therefore have had reduced ex ante incentives to prevent large spills and would have 
left victims uncompensated if such a spill did occur—exactly the problems that FR requirements 
would avoid if they were set at the appropriate level (see finding 4). 
Firms too small to meet the FR requirement are not permitted to drill. Consequently, an 
increase in FR requirements could result in greater market share for major oil companies if 
smaller firms exit because they cannot demonstrate FR directly or because they cannot remain 
profitable while paying premiums for insurance that would do so. For example, 16 of the 32 
firms drilling in deep water in the Gulf of Mexico in 2009 had market values below $30 billion 
(Muehlenbachs et al. 2011), which is likely to be the low end of the external costs of the 
Deepwater Horizon spill. The resulting decrease in competition could lead to (slightly) higher 
prices in oil markets and lower licensing fees. We view this cost as unlikely to be as great as the 
cost to society of the risk that a small firm causes a spill whose damages far exceed the value of 
the firm’s assets, but a conclusive answer is not possible without empirical study (see finding 5). 
                                                 
26 For vessels over 300 tons, OPA 90 links financial responsibility requirements to liability caps (40 U.S.C. 
§2716(a)). It is not clear why the statute does not do so for offshore facilities. Because the liability cap for such 
facilities is fixed at $75 million but the financial responsibility requirement can be anywhere in the $35 million to 
150 million range, the requirements could be insufficient. The default $35 million cap seems especially problematic: 
it fails to deal with the problem that FR is designed to address. A firm with, say, the means to cover $50 million in 
damages would be permitted to operate a facility but unable to cover even capped liability. If financial responsibility 
were raised to $150 million, firms would have to demonstrate double what they would have to pay based on the cap; 
this is probably good for the public, however, because firms are very likely to have liabilities beyond the cap. 
27 Note, however, that two other firms—Anadarko and MOEX—are part owners, and therefore co-responsible 
parties, in the Macondo well. These firms have not waived liability caps, but they are significantly smaller than BP. 
It is as yet unclear whether their lack of resources will ultimately limit recovery. Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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4.3 Government Oversight 
This section and the next discuss government oversight and mandatory insurance. There 
are two important differences between these policies and liability. First, both include third-party 
monitoring prior to a spill. Second, whereas liability affects safety culture by imposing costs on a 
firm after a spill, these policies affect safety culture by affecting costs before a spill. 
4.3.1 Monitoring 
There are several reasons monitoring could be desirable. First, if the results of monitoring 
are made public, monitoring could increase information available to stock market investors, who 
in turn could place greater pressure on firms to adopt stronger safety cultures (see Section 3.3). 
Second, information disclosed in monitoring could inform regulators and the public about 
the efficacy of a policy regime, prior to a spill. Because major spills are so rare, it is not possible 
to evaluate policies aimed at reducing risk of a major spill by observing their effect on the 
probability or severity of a spill. This consideration is particularly important because even if 
liability and FR requirements cause social costs to be internalized fully, firms may not adopt the 
socially optimal level of safety culture because of agency problems within the firm (see Section 
3). Monitoring and disclosure could reveal whether this is occurring. 
The third benefit of monitoring is that a qualified third-party monitor could be an 
important check on industry practices. Industry might go many years without another major spill, 
in which case complacency could lead to a gradual weakening of safety culture. Third-party 
monitors could make this less likely. Note that these benefits pertain to both government 
oversight and insurance, but there are important differences that are discussed below. 
4.3.2 Safety and Environmental Management Systems 
Government oversight can take many forms. The distinction between prescriptive- and 
performance-based regulation is discussed in Scarlett et al. (2011). We define stronger regulatory 
oversight as more intense monitoring combined with the threat of civil fines or criminal 
prosecution, which should lead to additional precautions and a lower ex ante expected 
probability of catastrophe. 
Stronger oversight has direct and indirect effects on safety culture. Via fines or 
prosecution, it directly raises the cost of failing to adopt a strong safety culture. Indirectly, if 
government discloses results of its monitoring, investors could learn about the company’s weak 
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One example of a government oversight policy that could directly affect safety culture is 
a safety and environmental management system (SEMS). In October 2010, BOEMRE issued a 
rule that requires firms to use a SEMS. The SEMS required by BOEMRE is the same as the 
recommended practice of the American Petroleum Institute, API RP 75. Many firms operating in 
the Gulf of Mexico, including BP, already use SEMS or something similar to it.  
As specified in the regulation, a SEMS contains 12 features, many of them discussed in 
Section 2; they include management of change, training, investigation of incidents, and auditing 
safety and environmental management programs. Although agreement among safety experts is 
not perfect, we consider a firm’s adoption of a SEMS as indicating an increase in safety culture. 
We do not evaluate the effect of a SEMS on the risk of a major accident and assume that, 
when properly adopted, it reduces the probability or severity. Instead, we focus on the effect on 
safety culture of a government-mandated SEMS. Prior to the regulation some firms may not have 
used a SEMS because of a lack of information or insufficient incentives; we discuss both 
possibilities in turn. Some firms may not have known how to implement a SEMS or about the 
benefits of the approach. We do not consider this relevant to drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, 
however, particularly for large firms that operate in other regions of the world, such as Norway 
and the United Kingdom, where a SEMS (or an equivalent) is required. Lack of information 
could be an issue for smaller firms, but we do not have evidence in either direction. 
We distinguish between government-mandated SEMS and the actual adoption of SEMS 
and a stronger safety culture. In theory, a firm could comply with a government-mandated SEMS 
on paper without significantly changing its safety culture, particularly if the legal requirements of 
a SEMS are vague. 
Thus, requiring a SEMS could cause firms to adopt a stronger safety culture, but not 
necessarily. Consider a simple model of a SEMS that costs c to adopt. The benefit, b, of the 
SEMS is a lower expected cost of a catastrophe, which depends on the liability cap and other 
factors. Before Deepwater Horizon, as firms weighed costs and benefits, some firms presumably 
decided that the costs outweighed the benefits and did not adopt a SEMS. Post Deepwater 
Horizon, with a government-mandated SEMS, the firm can choose to adopt a stronger safety 
culture or it can pay a cost, f, to satisfy the regulatory requirements. In other words, it is possible 
to fool the government into thinking that the firm has adopted a SEMS. But stronger government 
oversight raises f because it is more difficult to satisfy the SEMS requirements without adopting 
a safety culture. Examples of stronger oversight include hiring better-trained monitors, using 
third-party monitors, or adopting more specific requirements for the SEMS. Therefore, the Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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change in safety culture depends on b, c, and f: if b > c + f, the firm adopts a stronger safety 
culture. Mandating SEMS could have no effect on safety culture if f is relatively small, but 
stronger government oversight of the SEMS would raise the likelihood that the firm adopts a 
stronger safety culture. Thus, changes in government oversight beyond mandating a SEMS are 
necessary; specifically, the benefit of adopting the SEMS must exceed the cost of evading it (see 
finding 6). 
4.4 Mandatory Insurance 
Currently, there is no insurance requirement under OPA 90: insurance is one means of 
satisfying the FR requirement but is not required. Many large drilling firms self-insure through 
captive insurers. In principle, the FR requirement could be replaced by mandating third-party 
insurance. 
Although proof of FR may serve a similar role as insurance in ensuring that victims are 
compensated, neither by itself may provide adequate incentives for firms to take the socially 
desirable level of safety culture. First, as we have discussed, principal-agency problems within 
the firm might reduce the internal incentives for individuals within the firm to act in the firm’s 
best interest. Second, the fact that a firm has purchased insurance creates a new problem: the 
firm has an incentive to shirk because it is now financially covered in the case of an oil spill. To 
overcome this moral hazard problem, insurers might institute risk-based pricing so that firms 
with identifiably higher risk exposures pay higher rates (creating an incentive to reduce risk). 
Numerous other mechanisms are available, including coinsurance, deductibles, and direct 
monitoring of firm behavior. The level of monitoring and the overall effect of insurance on 
safety culture depends on the liability cap, as discussed in Section 4.6. Third-party monitoring 
thus constitutes an additional benefit of requiring insurance, which should be compared to 
government monitoring. 
4.4.1 Comparison of Government and Insurance Monitoring 
As with government oversight, a third-party insurance monitor can assist in overcoming 
some of the principal-agency conflicts inherent in the owner-manager relationship. Third-party 
monitoring by insurance companies may be redundant if government monitoring and 
enforcement are effective.  
For two reasons, however, third-party insurance can provide a mechanism for monitoring 
beyond that of the government or the firm itself. First, because of government’s lower pay scales, 
the private insurance industry could attract better-qualified monitors. Second, exposure to Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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liability creates a strong incentive for the insurance company to monitor well, which is not 
present with government monitoring. There is evidence that the insurance industry does play this 
role in the oil drilling industry (Booz Allen and Hamilton 2010), and that government monitoring 
efforts have been less than adequate. For example, Scarlett et al. (2011) note that MMS’s budget 
limitations and low pay scales compromised effective oversight. They also cite MMS’s own 
admission that despite inspection and enforcement efforts, it “could find no discernible 
improvements in safety performance trends” and had “limited methods to verify and document 
industry compliance with the regulatory performance standards.”  
On the other hand, if the liability caps are low, this monitoring incentive may not be very 
strong for private insurance. An additional advantage of government monitoring is that the 
results of the monitoring can be made public, which may be more difficult to require in a private 
insurance regime. 
Whether the government or the insurance industry ultimately is a more effective monitor 
of drilling activity is an empirical question that is beyond the scope of our analysis. The former 
depends on vigilant government enforcement; the latter relies upon market forces, which should 
be adequate if the potential liability is sufficiently high. Whichever approach is ultimately 
chosen, it is clear that unless the government significantly increases its own oversight capacity 
and monitoring activities, a requirement for third-party insurance is likely to result in more 
effective monitoring than government oversight.  
4.4.2 Potential Challenges to Mandating Private Insurance 
There are two reasons why a third-party insurance requirement might not work. First, 
monitoring is expensive, and it is difficult to observe a firm’s efforts to reduce the risk of a spill. 
The cost of monitoring could be too high for both insurance companies and drilling companies to 
remain profitable. 
The second reason why requiring third-party insurance might not be a viable solution is 
that insurance markets may be unable to raise adequate capital to insure against the potential 
liability. Indeed, we note that the industry argued this point in congressional hearings shortly 
after the Deepwater Horizon spill, when Congress was considering raising the liability cap. 
Robert Hartwig of the Insurance Information Institute testified on June 9, 2010, that it would be 
impossible for energy insurers or reinsurers to raise $10 billion of coverage. He cited several 
reasons, including the difficulty of underwriting for unlikely, but extremely severe events that 
are difficult to predict. Nevertheless, the insurance industry has a history of adapting to new 
liability caps and attracting the necessary capital to provide a market where demand exists. Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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Current industry concerns that increasing liability exposure will make firms uninsurable seem 
unfounded based on prior experience28 and on a recent proposal by Munich Re to provide 
insurance of $10 billion to $20 billion on a rig-by-rig basis (just three months after the industry 
testified it would impossible to insure at that level).29 However, we note that the levels of 
insurance that would be required for deepwater drilling under our recommended liability cap and 
financial responsibility requirements are likely to exceed even this amount; further study of this 
issue is warranted. 
4.5 Risk-Based Fees 
The central economic problem regarding safety is that managers (and perhaps 
shareholders) may not choose the socially desirable level of safety culture because its social 
benefit is not fully internalized. Raising the liability cap and FR requirement would help, but as 
noted above, there may still be damages that are not recoverable.  
An insurance pool, currently under consideration as a means of preventing small firms 
from exiting under mandatory insurance, could actually exacerbate the problem (Bergin 2010). 
Suppose, as in some proposals, that an insurance pool is constructed in which a firm pays a 
premium in proportion to the number of wells it has. This premium structure creates a classic 
moral hazard problem in which, compared with the status quo, there is a stronger incentive to (1) 
adopt a weaker safety culture and (2) drill wells that the firm knows, ex ante, are riskier.  
Another way to raise the benefit of adopting a strong safety culture would simultaneously 
address the perverse incentives created by an insurance pool. Imposing risk-based drilling fees 
would reduce the profits of a firm that does not have a strong safety culture. A regulator, 
insurance company, or industry organization would rate the level of safety at each well. Under an 
insurance pool, the responsible party would pay a premium that is proportional to the number of 
wells and the safety score at each operation. The premium could depend on the subcontractors, 
which would encourage the operators to employ subcontractors that also have strong safety 
cultures. This would resolve potential conflicts of interest between firm and subcontractor 
(Section 3.4). 
                                                 
28 Boyd (2001) provides evidence of similar unfounded concerns raised by the insurance industry during debates 
over OPA 1990 and CERCLA reauthorization. 
29 See Munich Re press release, September 12, 2010, 
http://www.munichre.com/en/media_relations/press_releases/2010/2010_09_12_press_release.aspx.  Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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Three issues would have to be addressed in a scheme with risk-based fees: measurement, 
transparency, and reporting. Ideally, the fee would be based on the ex ante probability and 
severity of a spill from each well. Estimating this probability is no small task, and it would have 
to be studied intensively. At the outset, it seems reasonable to set the fee based on (1) the firm’s 
past safety record; (2) observable characteristics of the well (depth, pressure, etc.); and (3) the 
adoption of certain safety culture policies (such as compensation schemes or promotion criteria 
that reward safety). The fee would be updated when more information is available—for example, 
using subsequent data on a firm’s safety record to change the weighting of the components or 
add new components. Although estimating the ex ante probability of a spill is extremely difficult, 
the same problem arises with third-party insurance and government oversight. Thus, the risk 
measurement problem is not unique to using risk-based fees. 
An important question is whether the results of the safety rating would be made public. 
This would provide some of the benefits of third-party monitoring. Concerns over releasing trade 
secrets would have to be addressed in that case. 
Clearly, firms would have an incentive to misreport—for example, by hiding accidents. 
Again, this is not different from monitoring under mandatory third-party insurance or stronger 
government oversight (or if a firm links compensation to safety outcomes). One way to address 
this problem is to impose fines or jail time for misreporting. Alternatively, a firm could be given 
time to address any problems it reports. If the problem is addressed to the satisfaction of the 
regulator or auditor, the safety score would not change. This would remove at least some of the 
disincentive to report truthfully. 
A final note regarding risk-based fees is that the approach could easily be used for other 
institutions, such as fees for drilling permits or for membership in the Marine Well Containment 
Corporation (MWCC). Rather than requiring large firms to pay a fixed fee to support MWCC, 
fees could be based on each firm’s number of wells and the safety score at each. 
In summary, we find that risk-based fees would increase the incentive for a stronger 
safety culture and could provide the benefits of monitoring. The approach could be used in 
combination other policies, including an insurance pool or MWCC (see finding 7). 
4.6 Policy Interactions 
Two interactions between policies must be considered. The first is the relationship 
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4.6.1 Interaction between Liability and Financial Responsibility 
Suppose that, for a given firm, there is a risk of, at most, one major spill (Section 5 
discusses the implications of relaxing this assumption). If there were no possibility of 
bankruptcy, raising the liability cap would increase the firm’s safety culture because it would 
increase the financial risk of a spill. However, as discussed above, if the value of a firm’s assets 
is less than the liability cap, raising the cap would not affect its safety culture unless the FR 
requirement were simultaneously raised; the firm would have to acquire additional assets (or 
purchase insurance) to continue drilling. 
Similarly, raising the FR requirement while maintaining the liability cap may not affect 
safety culture. Firms would have to hold more assets to drill, but the benefit of adopting a 
stronger safety culture would be unchanged because firms are not exposed to any additional risk 
(see finding 8). 
4.6.2 Interaction between Liability and Mandatory Insurance 
A mandatory insurance requirement complements liability in a similar manner as FR. If 
liability is capped and there is no FR requirement (or it is lower than the cap), small firms would 
have little incentive to adopt a strong safety culture because they could lose only the value of 
their assets. In this case, the incentive for safety culture could be increased by requiring firms to 
have insurance up to the liability cap. For larger firms (for which bankruptcy is less likely), the 
incentive for safety culture of raising the liability cap and requiring third-party insurance is more 
difficult to characterize. In principle, the moral hazard problem created by insurance could result 
in a weaker safety culture; further study of this question is warranted. 
As Section 4.4 discusses, the insurance company would have to monitor to ensure that the 
firm’s safety culture and other decisions did not expose the insurance company to excessive risk. 
This relationship between liability and insurance is really a special case of the relationship 
between liability and FR, since third-party insurance is one option available for firms to 
demonstrate FR—though, as described above, insurance can provide a monitoring function that 
FR alone cannot (see finding 9). 
The level of monitoring depends on the liability cap and other factors, however. A low 
liability cap could provide only a small incentive for private insurance monitoring. We note that 
government monitoring is not linked to the liability cap in this way. Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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4.7 Summary of Policies 
Table 2 summarizes the features of five policy changes that would increase safety culture 
incentives. The first column shows whether the policy affects a drilling firm’s costs before or 
after a spill. The second column shows whether the policy reduces the likelihood that a firm 
declares bankruptcy without covering the full costs of the spill—if this is the case, the policy has 
a smaller effect on safety culture at small firms. The next column shows how the policy affects 
monitoring, followed by its potential to create a moral hazard problem. The final column notes 
the interactions with other policies. See the previous sections for explanations of each entry.  
 
Table 2. Summary of Safety Culture Policies 
Policy proposal 
Does the policy ... 
affect firm’s 












Raise or eliminate 
liability caps 
After  No  No  No  Yes (see 
finding 8 and 
9) 









Before   Yes  No   
Introduce risk-based 
fees 
Before    Yes  No   
4.8 Summary of Findings 
The following list includes our findings on policy and safety culture: 
1.  Tort liability and OPA 90 require firms to pay for cleanup costs and economic and 
natural resource damages. When firms make decisions related to safety culture, their Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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cost benefit analysis for adopting a stronger safety culture should reflect the expected 
social harm from a spill.  
2.  Caps on spill liability in federal law are below worst-case damages from drilling in 
the Gulf of Mexico, although the liability caps in OPA 90 are not generally binding 
because of other provisions in state and federal law. Caps do limit firms’ liability, 
directly for some types of damage, and indirectly by restricting avenues available to 
plaintiffs and raising plaintiffs’ litigation costs, which reduces the number of cases 
firms must defend and the amounts they must pay in settlements.  
3.  Liability raises the benefit of adopting a strong safety culture, as long as the expected 
damages payout, plus other possible costs (e.g., legal costs), is no greater than the 
firm’s assets. 
4.  Current FR requirements are well below expected damages from a worst-case spill 
and therefore are insufficient to prevent firms from engaging in activities whose risks 
they cannot bear. The safety incentives generated by liability for small firms are 
limited, in many cases dramatically.  
5.  Significant increases in liability caps and financial responsibility requirements may 
force some small firms out of the Gulf because they will be unable to afford liability 
insurance. Competition may decline, (slightly) raising oil prices and reducing lease 
fees. These effects are likely outweighed by small firms’ failure to fully internalize 
social costs. 
6.  Without adequate monitoring and enforcement, firms may be able to satisfy the 
regulatory requirements without changing their safety culture. In that case, the 
adoption of a safety culture would depend not on the regulatory requirement, but 
rather on other policy and economic forces that affect safety culture. 
7.  Risk-based fees directly raise the benefit of adopting a strong safety culture and could 
be implemented in such a way that includes third-party monitoring.  
8.  Raising the liability cap without changing the financial responsibility requirement 
would not affect safety culture at a firm whose asset value is less than the cap. For 
such a firm, both the liability cap and the financial responsibility requirement would 
have to be raised to increase the incentive for a strong safety culture. Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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9.   Increasing the liability cap and mandating insurance up to the new cap would 
increase the incentive for safety culture, similarly to jointly raising the liability cap 
and the financial responsibility requirement. 
10. Mandatory third-party insurance (as opposed to self-insurance or the use of captive 
insurers) may be an effective substitute for government monitoring. 
5. Policy Recommendations 
5.1 Liability Caps 
Capping liability for damages resulting from oil spills tempers drilling firms’ incentives 
for strong safety culture (see finding 1, Section 4.8). Eliminating liability caps would force 
drilling firms to fully internalize the costs of drilling and fulfill the compensatory goals of 
liability policy. 
Eliminating liability caps may not be politically feasible or consistent with other policies 
(e.g., a mandatory insurance requirement if markets are unable to insure against unlimited 
liability). But if we assume there will be a liability cap, then the level at which it is set remains 
an important policy choice. The current federal (OPA 90) liability cap is $75 million, a figure 
woefully out of proportion to the estimated $20 billion to $60 billion in third-party damages from 
the Deepwater Horizon spill. Given this new information about the possible size of an oil spill in 
the Gulf of Mexico, perhaps the simplest option is to raise liability caps to somewhere in this $20 
billion to $60 billion range. This would treat the Deepwater Horizon spill as a worst-case 
scenario. Although administratively expedient, this approach has several problems. 
First, it is not known whether the Deepwater Horizon spill is really a worst-case event. 
The industry says that advances in well containment and lessons learned make a similar spill 
unlikely or impossible, but this is little comfort: the industry apparently believed that a spill like 
Deepwater Horizon was impossible—until it happened. A new spill could occur under different 
conditions with different causes and could create even greater environmental and economic 
harm. There are, of course, physical limits to the plausible size of a spill, but there is little 
evidence that the Deepwater Horizon spill (and therefore the damages associated with it) reached 
those limits. In short, a liability cap based on Deepwater Horizon damages might be too low to 
give firms adequate safety incentives. 
On the other hand, there is strong evidence that the Macondo well was particularly 
dangerous: it was a high-pressure well in deep water. The worst-case damages from other wells Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
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might be far less. Setting a uniform cap based on the Deepwater Horizon damages would 
therefore provide little extra benefit30 for less dangerous wells.  
A one-size-fits-all cap calibrated to Deepwater Horizon damages, therefore, is likely to 
be a relatively poor solution. A more considered alternative is to set liability caps individually for 
each well. In each case, the cap would correspond to the estimated damages associated with a 
worst-case spill. Such an approach would generate the same incentives to invest in safety as 
unlimited liability (since firms would not invest beyond the level required to prevent or contain a 
worst case spill even if liability were unlimited). Furthermore, these incentives would be tailored 
to the conditions of a given well. For particularly dangerous wells, such as those in very deep 
water accessing high-pressure reservoirs, damages estimates might be even higher than the 
Deepwater Horizon damages. But for many wells—those in shallower water, for example—the 
cap would likely be much lower. 
In practice, such a tailored damages cap could operate in a number of ways. Perhaps most 
simply, experts could determine criteria that contribute to risk, such as depth and reservoir 
pressure. At the extreme of simplicity, this might result in one cap for shallow-water operations 
and another for those in deep water. 
A more finely tailored approach is possible, however. Firms already must make estimates 
of worst-case-discharge volumes, provide detailed response plans, and anticipate the 
environmental impacts of a spill as part of the BOEMRE permitting process. Key components of 
an expert estimate of damages from a worst-case spill are therefore already available. It should 
be possible to make such a calculation for each well and generate individual liability caps. It is 
worth noting that this approach is similar to the process a third-party insurer might use to 
determine the level of coverage available to a drilling firm (and the level of associated 
premiums). Whatever the source of the relevant information, tailored caps would maintain safety 
incentives and may be easier to implement than a uniform cap or eliminating the cap. 
We note that the liability cap should include all payments to victims, compensation for 
natural resource damages, and any administrative, civil or criminal sanctions. A final caveat 
concerns civil and criminal sanctions. In practice, the public may not be able to fully 
recover social damages from the firm, for example, because of legal costs. Additional 
                                                 
30 In terms of incentives to invest in safety, a liability cap beyond expected worst-case damages would still serve to 
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government policy intervention is justified in this case; increasing oversight or allowing criminal 
sanctions are two examples of policies that would address this consideration. On the other hand, 
if social damages are fully internalized from payments to victims, imposing additional sanctions 
could lead to over deterrence.31 
5.2 Financial Responsibility 
The same general arguments regarding the rationale for raising liability caps apply to FR 
requirements. If caps are eliminated, FR requirements should be raised to at least the level of 
expected worst-case damages from a spill. Lower FR requirements would expose the public to 
risk that a small firm that causes a large spill would declare bankruptcy to avoid paying the 
damages costs. If liability caps remain, FR requirements should be no lower than liability limits, 
for the same reason. 
The links between liability caps and FR requirements superficially suggest that the two 
be equal. However, there are some grounds for suggesting that FR requirements be set higher 
than liability caps. First, some costs are excluded from the statutory caps on third-party liability. 
The most obvious excluded cost is spill removal, which is explicitly left uncapped in OPA 90. 
Also, penalties other than third-party liability are a prominent feature of U.S. law: the Clean 
Water Act provides for civil penalties, and criminal liability (including financial settlements 
made under threat of such liability) is a powerful tool available to federal and state governments 
seeking compensation for natural resources damages. A firm whose financial resources are 
exhausted by third-party damages would be unable to pay these costs, and a firm that expected to 
be constrained in this way would not take the additional precautions that these forms of liability 
would otherwise promote. 
Second, OPA 90 currently requires only one demonstration of FR for any firm, regardless 
of the number of wells for which it is the responsible party. FR law therefore assumes that only 
one spill will affect a firm at any given time. Although the chances of simultaneous spills are 
low, they are not zero. Furthermore, a self-insuring firm’s ability to compensate spill victims 
does not recover immediately after a spill. Therefore, a second spill, even if it occurs some time 
                                                 
31 From an optimal deterrence standpoint, the total costs paid by the responsible party should equal the social 
damages caused by the spill. While over-deterrence is theoretically plausible, the evidence for under-deterrence 
discussed throughout the paper appears stronger, particularly in light of the findings in Krupnick et al. (2011) 
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after the first, may still exceed a firm’s ability to compensate. A FR requirement greater than that 
needed to cover a worst-case spill would provide a cushion for these costs. How much greater 
this level should be is a difficult question that depends on estimates of spill damage and removal 
costs, the likelihood of events that might cause multiple spills,32 and the risk aversion of the 
public. 
We therefore recommend that FR requirements be set at least as high as liability caps, 
with some consideration given to yet higher requirements. 
5.3 Insurance 
Firms drilling in deepwater should be required to purchase third-party insurance to cover 
all cleanup and containment costs as well as economic and natural resource damages. Similar to 
the FR requirement, the level of insurance should be at least as high as the liability cap, and 
probably greater. The recommendation that third-party insurance be required—as opposed to 
allowing self-insurance or captive insurance—is based on an assumption that government 
monitoring will not be stringent enough to ensure an adequate level of safety. If government 
monitoring is deemed adequate, allowing self-insurance or captive insurance might be 
appropriate. In addition, as we noted above, there is concern in the industry that capital markets 
will not be adequate to supply third-party insurance to cover a worst-case scenario. Thus, if no 
third-party insurance product is available, firms wishing to drill in deep water should be required 
to provide proof of FR to the government. 
5.4 Risk-Based Fees 
Risk-based fees provide direct incentives for safety culture and can also be designed to 
provide monitoring that increases the amount of information available to the public. Introducing 
an insurance pool without risk-based fees could create a significant moral hazard problem in 
which the insured firms undertake riskier projects than they would in the absence of insurance. 
Risk-based fees can be used in conjunction with certain other policies, including membership in 
the Marine Well Containment Corporation.  
                                                 
32 Natural disasters and terrorism are examples. The former and (likely) the latter, however, are explicitly excluded 
from strict liability under OPA 90. If such an event were to cause multiple spills, firms would not be liable, and 
costs—at least under federal law—would be borne by the public. Resources for the Future  Cohen et al. 
47 
5.5 Summary of Policy Recommendations 
This paper has examined the role of government in ensuring safety culture at oil drilling 
firms. It presumes that society has already determined that under “good” safety practices, the 
benefits of deepwater drilling outweigh its risks. Liability laws can provide an economic 
incentive for firms to adopt and maintain a strong safety culture. Increased government 
regulation, monitoring, and enforcement can reduce the likelihood and magnitude of future 
spills, but we believe that this would be inadequate without significant changes to liability law, 
financial responsibility requirements, and insurance. Therefore, we provide recommendations on 
the policies that should be used, in addition to stronger government oversight. 
All the policies discussed in Section 4 have a positive effect on safety culture. But that 
does not mean that they can be chosen independently of one another, as the discussion of policy 
interactions in Section 4.6 has demonstrated. Therefore, we provide several alternative sets of 
policies that would each have a significant effect on safety culture. 
Our preferred approach is to raise the liability cap to the level of the social damages 
expected from the estimated worst-case discharge from a given well. Firms must already 
estimate such a worst-case discharge in the permitting process. This information, combined with 
expert damages analysis, would generate a risk-based damages cap for each well. In combination 
with setting the liability cap for each well equal to the worst-case social costs of a spill, firms 
drilling in deep water should be required to purchase third-party insurance to cover all cleanup 
and containment costs and all economic and natural resource damages arising from a spill. Third-
party insurance not only ensures that victims will be compensated but has the added benefit of 
third-party monitoring in the absence of effective government enforcement capacity. 
As discussed above, third-party insurance may not be feasible in such a liability regime. 
If third-party insurance is not feasible, firms wishing to drill in deep water should be required to 
provide proof of financial responsibility to the government at a level no smaller than the 
maximum liability of a firm’s wells. Setting the requirement greater than this maximum 
would ensure that the firm can cover costs not included in the liability cap and the costs if a 
second major spill occurs. 
Finally, we reiterate that risk-based drilling fees should be used as part of an insurance 
pool to reduce moral hazard. They could be used in other contexts as well, such as the Marine 
Well Containment Corporation, leasing, and permitting. 
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